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Executive Summary 
 
On August 31, 2004, for the first time, the nation’s mutual fund companies reported how 
they cast their proxy votes at the public companies in which they invest.  The disclosure 
is the result of Securities and Exchange Commission rules adopted in January 2003, rules 
that the AFL-CIO first petitioned for in December 2000 and that the mutual fund industry 
strenuously opposed.   
 
This report evaluates how the 10 largest mutual fund families voted when presented with 
the opportunity to curb CEO pay abuses at a dozen S&P 500 companies in 2004.  We 
chose executive compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire 
investor Warren Buffet, “The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation.” 
 
We found that, when it comes to voting proxies on proposals involving CEO pay abuses, 
there is significant variation among fund families.  The scores in our survey ranged from 
a high of 100% for American Century to a low of 20% for Putnam.   
 
Fidelity, the nation’s largest fund family and the most vocal opponent to proxy vote 
disclosure, ranked 9th out of 10 in our survey with a 25% score.  Vanguard, the other 
leading opponent to proxy vote disclosure, ranked 2nd in the survey with a 75% score.   
 
Although the SEC rule does not require mutual funds to disclose business relationships 
with portfolio companies, our own research indicates that, of the 120 proxy voting 
decisions in this survey, 25 involved a mutual fund advisor that has a business 
relationship with the portfolio company.   
 
These widespread conflicts of interest not only underline the importance of transparent 
proxy voting by mutual funds, but also point to the need to enhance the SEC rule to 
require mutual fund advisors to disclose business relationships with portfolio companies. 
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Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting Disclosure 
 
On August 31, 2004, for the first time, the nation’s mutual fund companies reported how they cast their 
proxy votes at the public companies in which they invest on behalf of their mutual fund shareholders.  
The disclosure is the result of new Securities and Exchange Commission rules adopted in January 2003, 
rules that the AFL-CIO first petitioned for in December 2000 and that the mutual fund industry 
strenuously opposed.   
 
Now mutual fund companies must do what investment firms that manage private pension plans have 
long been required to do by the Department of Labor—tell their clients how they cast proxy votes on 
their behalf at the annual shareholder meetings that every public corporation holds.  At these meetings, 
shareholders have the responsibility to vote on the critical decisions shaping each company’s 
governance—decisions such as who will serve on the board of directors, how the CEO will be paid and 
what general policies the shareholders will recommend to the company’s board.  Casting proxy votes on 
these issues is the most direct means for shareholders to oversee the corporations they own. 
 
Millions of working families, including more than six million union households, invest their retirement 
savings in mutual funds, yet have been kept in the dark as to how mutual funds use their money to 
influence corporate elections.1  For these families, proxy vote disclosure represents a long-overdue 
victory.  Moreover, if greater transparency of mutual fund proxy voting leads the $7.4 trillion mutual 
fund industry to become more engaged in corporate governance, as the SEC reasoned in issuing its final 
rule, it will benefit all public company investors and not just fund shareholders.2   
 
Mutual funds own 22% of U.S. corporate stock, so their proxy votes on such issues as CEO pay and 
director elections can be decisive.3  While mutual funds have a legal duty to cast these votes in the best 
interests of their investors, mutual fund firms can have an economic interest in voting with management 
even if such votes may not be in the interest of fund investors.  This conflict of interest stems from 
mutual fund firms’ desire to sell lucrative 401(k) management and other financial services to the same 
companies at which they vote proxies on behalf of mutual fund investors.   
 
It is this conflict that may lead mutual funds to act as rubberstamps for corporate management regardless 
of the best interests of their investors.  To provide the transparency necessary to rein in this conflict, the 
AFL-CIO petitioned the SEC in December 2000 to adopt rules requiring disclosure of mutual fund 
proxy votes.  In the wake of subsequent scandals at companies like Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, the 
AFL-CIO again called in the SEC in July 2002 to require mutual funds to disclose their votes.   
 
When the SEC responded with a proposed rule in September 2002, a then-record 8,000 individual and 
institutional investors sent comment letters to the SEC, the overwhelming majority in support of 
disclosure.4  Only the mutual fund industry, led by Fidelity Investments and Vanguard, opposed it.  
Despite intense industry opposition, the SEC voted 4-1 to approve the proposed rule in January 2003, 
and established August 31, 2004 as the deadline for disclosure of votes cast during the year ending the 
June 30, 2004.   
                                                 
1 45% of the nation’s 13 million unionized workers participate in defined contribution plans, according to  “National Compensation Survey: Employee 
Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, March 2003,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 2004.  Many union members who do not participate in 
defined contribution plans invest directly in mutual funds. 
22004 Mutual Fund Fact Book, 44th Edition, Investment Company Institute, 2004.  Equity funds account for $3.68 trillion of the $7.4 trillion in total mutual 
funds assets.  “Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies”, SEC, 
Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922, January 31, 2003. 
3 2004 Mutual Fund Fact Book, 44th Edition, Investment Company Institute, 2004.   
4 Ibid. 
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As a result, mutual fund investors now have the information necessary to determine if the votes mutual 
fund companies cast truly represent investors’ best interests, as required by law, and do not represent an 
effort to curry favor with the CEOs of portfolio companies in order to win lucrative contracts for 
managing employee benefit plans.   
 
To mark the release of the mutual fund proxy votes--and enable investors to more easily evaluate and 
interpret their fund’s voting practices--the AFL-CIO prepared this report evaluating how the nation’s ten 
largest mutual fund families cast their proxy votes in 2004 on executive pay proposals at twelve S&P 
500 companies with clearly excessive CEO pay and poor performance.  We chose executive 
compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, “The acid 
test for reform will be CEO compensation.”5  The report also highlights business relationships between 
the mutual fund firms and the twelve companies.   
 
We encourage mutual fund investors and 401(k) plan trustees to use this report to evaluate whether their 
mutual fund company, or a mutual fund company that they are considering, is casting its proxy votes in 
a way that is consistent with their best interests.  
 
Mutual Funds and Executive Compensation 
 
Corporate governance experts have long been concerned by the failure of mutual fund companies to 
challenge management on corporate governance.  The consequences of their conflicted voting practices 
are perhaps most apparent in the skyrocketing CEO pay over the past two decades.  In 1980, CEO pay 
stood at approximately 42 times the average worker.  In 2003, CEO pay reached 301 times the average 
worker’s pay.6  The majority of this increase has been due to stock options, which have become the 
biggest component of today’s CEO pay packages.    
 
The AFL-CIO supports reasonable and just compensation for all workers, including executives.  But by 
any standard, many of today’s executive compensation packages are excessive and bear no relationship 
to performance.  In 2003, for example, earnings for the US’s largest 500 companies grew by a median of 
9.6 percent, while the median total pay for the chief executives at these companies jumped by 22 
percent.7  These executive pay excesses come at the expense of shareholders, as well as the company 
and its employees. 
 
The disconnect between CEO pay and long-term corporate performance remains the biggest failure of 
our corporate governance system.  As Richard Breeden, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, recently warned, “We have not made any progress on pervasive abuses in the 
compensation process and that is the root of most of the big frauds.”8 
 
Although shareholders do not have the ability to vote on every component of executive compensation, 
all companies are required to obtain shareholder approval of their equity compensation plans, including 
stock options.  In addition, shareholders vote on resolutions submitted by fellow shareholders seeking to 
rein in runaway CEO pay.  These shareholder resolutions, for example, call on companies to expense 
stock options, to require that future equity compensation grants to senior executives be performance-
based, or to submit executive severance agreements (“golden parachutes”) to a shareholder vote.   
                                                 
5 Letter to Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2002 Annual Report, February 21, 2003. 
6 Business Week, as reported in Anderson, Sarah et al, Executive Excess 2004, Institute for Policy Studies and United For a Fair Economy, August 31, 2004. 
7 Michaels, Adrian, “Off the Leash: What Will Bring Executive Pay Under Control?”, Financial Times, August 24, 2004.  Hodgson, Paul, CEO Pay 2003, 
The Corporate Library, July 2004. 
8 Michaels, Adrian, “Off the Leash: What Will Bring Executive Pay Under Control?”, Financial Times, August 24, 2004. 
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In this report, we look at how the nation’s largest mutual fund families cast their proxy votes on a 
representative cross-section of executive compensation proposals at twelve S&P 500 companies with 
clearly excessive CEO pay and poor performance.  For each of the twelve votes, the report includes a 
case study that describes the executive compensation abuse and the issue on which shareholders were 
asked to vote. 

Methodology and Sources 
 
Under the new SEC disclosure rule, each mutual fund associated with a fund family is required to 
disclose its proxy votes.  Because large mutual fund companies such as Fidelity act as advisors to 
hundreds of mutual funds, a particular stock may be held by dozens of separate mutual funds within a 
particular fund family.  In many cases, mutual fund families cast their proxy votes as block, but this is 
not always the case.   
 
For example, Fidelity index funds, which are managed by Geode Capital under a sub-advisory 
arrangement, use separate proxy voting guidelines from other Fidelity funds.  As a result, Fidelity index 
funds did not vote in the same way as its non-index funds on many votes.  We also observed that Janus 
and T. Rowe price mutual funds did not always vote as a block. 
 
Therefore, the proxy votes disclosed in this report represent the vote cast by what we estimate to be the 
majority of the shares of a particular stock held by a mutual fund family.  These estimates are based on 
recent shareholder data from LionShares, which is compiled primarily from SEC Form 13-F and N-30D 
filings.  We caution, however, that the portfolio data for a mutual fund may not correspond to the fund’s 
portfolio on the record date for a particular shareholder meeting. 
 
To identify potential business relationships between the adviser to a mutual fund family and the twelve 
S&P 500 companies, we relied on databases provided by Nelson’s Marketplace and Larkspur 
DataMaster Pro.  Both of these sources aggregate data from the Form 5500s that corporate retirement 
plans are required to file with the Department of Labor.   
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Key Findings 
 
• When it comes to voting proxies on proposals involving CEO pay abuses, there is significant 
variation among fund families.  The scores in our survey ranged from a high of 100% for American 
Century to a low of 20% for Putnam.  Putnam was also the only fund that failed to cast a vote at a 
portfolio company included in this survey (Putnam did not vote on a CSX shareholder proposal to 
rein in golden parachutes or on any other issue subject to a vote at CSX’s 2004 annual meeting).  
 
• The survey results indicate that the SEC rule requiring mutual fund proxy vote disclosure appears to 
have had a significant impact on the voting practices of some fund families.  In the 1990s, mutual 
funds reflexively voted with management, regardless of the best interests of their mutual fund 
investors.  While this still appears to be the case at some fund families, others appear to be 
increasingly willing to oppose management when necessary to protect long-term shareholder value. 
 
• Fidelity, the nation’s largest fund family and the most vocal opponent to proxy vote disclosure, 
ranked 9th out of 10 in our survey with a 25% score.  Fidelity voted against all eight shareholder 
proposals to rein in runaway CEO pay, but also opposed three of the four management proposals.   
 
• Vanguard, the other leading opponent to proxy vote disclosure, ranked 2nd in the survey with a 75% 
score.  Vanguard was one of only two mutual fund families that voted against all four management 
proposals seeking excessive executive compensation (American Century was the other). 
 
• There was only one proposal for which all of the mutual fund families holding the stock voted in the 
same way.  Nine fund families voted against a management proposal seeking to renew the Stock 
Incentive Plan at Broadcom (American Funds did not hold the stock).  This is perhaps no surprise, 
since an overwhelming majority (89 percent) of Class A shares voted against the plan.  As The New 
York Times observed about Broadcom, “just when you thought you had seen the most outrageous 
transfer of shareholder wealth to executives through stock options, along comes a company that tops 
them all.”9  Unfortunately, the proposal passed over the objection of outside shareholders because 
the company's dual class stock structure gives insiders disproportionate voting power. 
 
• One shortcoming of the SEC rule is that it does not allow investors to determine whether a conflict 
of interest compromised their mutual fund’s proxy vote at a particular company, since the rule does 
not require mutual funds to disclose their business relationships with the portfolio companies.  Our 
own research indicates that, of the 120 proxy voting decisions reported in this survey, 25 involved a 
mutual fund advisor that has a business relationship with the portfolio company.  Fidelity maintained 
the most business relationships (8), followed by Capital Research and Management (as advisor to the 
American Funds) (5), and Vanguard (4).   
 
• These widespread conflicts of interest not only underline the importance of transparent proxy voting 
by mutual funds, but also point to the need to enhance the SEC rule to require mutual fund 
companies to disclose business relationships with portfolio companies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Gretchen Morgenson, “Bubble Lives on at Broadcom, Where Options Still Rain Down,” The New York Times, April 18, 2004. 
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
Top 10 Mutual Fund Families by Net Assets1 
Rank Mutual Fund Family Assets ($Bil) 
1. Fidelity  $513
2. American Funds 393
3. Vanguard 355
4. Franklin Templeton  100
5. Putnam 98
6. T. Rowe Price 75
7. Janus 72
8. AIM Investments 67
9. Oppenheimer Funds 56
10. American Century  55
1Includes only stock funds available to individuals 
Source: Morningstar, as reported in the New York Times, February 8, 2004. 
 
 
Top 10 Mutual Fund Families by Voting Score 
Rank Mutual Fund Family Voting Score 
1. American Century  100%
2. Vanguard 75%
3. Janus 71%
4. Oppenheimer Funds 70%
5. T. Rowe Price 58%
6. American Funds 50%
7. Franklin Templeton  45%
8. AIM Investments 30%
9. Fidelity  25%
10. Putnam 20%
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Allergan Inc. 
 
Meeting Date: 4/28/04 
Item # 3:  Expense Stock Options  
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
American Century 
American Funds 
Franklin-Templeton 
Vanguard 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
AIM 
Fidelity 
Janus 
Putnam 
T. Rowe Price 
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Allergan, Inc. 
 
David E. I. Pyott 
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation14 
 
Salary  $1,069,231
Bonus $1,075,000
Other15 $48,747
Option Grants16 $8,720,838  
2003 Total $10,913,816
 
 
At pharmaceutical company Allergan, Inc., executives disproportionately benefit from stock options. In 
2003, the top five most highly paid Allergan executives received 22.7 percent of all stock options 
granted to employees.  Like at many companies, stock options make up the biggest part of Allergan 
CEO David Pyott’s total compensation.  In 2003, Mr. Pyott alone received 13.6 percent of all grants to 
employees.  He also exercised $6.6 million in stock options from previous years’ grants, and as of 
December 31, 2003 held over $33 million in unexercised in-the-money stock options.17 
 
Allergan executives received these generous option grants in 2003 after a period of underperformance.  
Business Week ranked Allergan 446 in the S&P 500, and 15 out of 16 in the pharmaceuticals and biotech 
industry.  Business Week graded Allergan an “F” for 1-year and 3-year profit growth, net margin, and 
return on equity.18  Independent proxy voting consultant Glass Lewis & Co. gave Allergan an “F” for 
pay-for-performance, noting that Allergan “paid more than its peers, but performed worse than its 
peers.”19 
 
Many investors believe that not expensing stock options has led to their overuse in executive pay.  Total 
potential dilution from stock options at Allergan is 19 percent compared to a peer group average of 17.5 
percent.20  No wonder at Allergan’s April 28, 2004 annual meeting, shareholders approved a proposal to 
require stock option expensing by 62 percent of votes cast.  Keeping stock options off the books has also 
artificially boosted Allergan’s profit reports, thereby further contributing to high executive pay.  Had 
Allergan expensed in 2003, its net earnings would have been reduced by an additional $36.4 million – 
representing a 69 percent increase in net losses.21 
  
                                                 
14Allergan, Inc. Proxy Statement filed March 17, 2004. 
15 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation” and “All Other Compensation” including country club dues, financial planning services, gasoline and car 
allowances, life insurance, and above-market interest on deferred compensation. 
16 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
17 Allergan, Inc. Proxy Statement filed March 17, 2004. 
18 “S&P 500 Performance Ranking”, Business Week, April 5, 2004.   
19 Glass, Lewis & Co. Proxy Paper, April 14, 2004 
20 Investor Responsibility Research Center, April 8, 2004. 
21 Allergan, Inc. 10-K filed March 5, 2004. 
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CSX Corp. 
 
 
Meeting Date:  5/5/04 
 
Item # 5:  Limit Golden Parachutes 
 
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
American Century 
 
T. Rowe Price 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
Fidelity  
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
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CSX Corp. 
 
Michael J. Ward 
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation22 
 
Salary  $808,333  
Other23 $182,732
Option Grants24 $3,572,000
2003 Total $4,563,065
 
 
Railroad company CSX Corp. has a history of lavish sendoffs for senior executives.  Former CSX CEO 
John Snow received a lump-sum $68.9 million payment when he left to become U.S. Treasury Secretary 
in 2003.  This included $33 million in lieu of future pension payments that the company valued at $2.9 
million a year -- more than Snow's $2.1 million salary and bonus during his final year on the job.  In 
computing Snow's pension, CSX credited Snow with 19 unearned years of service and included 250,000 
shares of restricted stock which would not have vested had the compensation committee not approved 
accelerated vesting the previous year.25 
 
Current CSX CEO Michael Ward also stands to receive a generous golden parachute in the event of his 
termination.  Under a five-year employment agreement signed in 2001, if Mr. Ward is terminated other 
than for cause, he is entitled to the salary and one-half of the target bonus otherwise payable for the 
balance of the agreement.  CSX will also remove restrictions on a portion of the 165,000 shares of 
restricted stock he was granted in 2001.26  
 
Business Week ranked CSX 447 in the S&P 500 and second to last in its industry for its poor 
performance.  Business Week also gave the CSX an "F" on four performance measures (1-year total 
return, 1-year sales growth, 1-year profit growth and return on equity).27  Likewise, independent proxy 
voting consultant Glass Lewis and Co. gave CSX a "D" in pay-for-performance, noting that CSX paid 
more than its peers, but performed worse than its peers.28 
 
Many shareholders are concerned that large golden parachutes can reward underperformance leading up 
to an executive’s termination.  Moreover, they are rarely justified in light of the significant 
compensation already awarded most executives.  At CSX’s May 5, 2004 annual shareholder meeting, 73 
percent of votes cast were in favor of a proposal to require shareholder approval of golden parachutes. 
                                                 
22 CSX Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 31, 2004. 
23 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation” and “All Other Compensation” including personal use of company aircraft and above-market earnings on 
deferred compensation. 
24 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
25 David S. Hilzenrath, "CSX Gave Snow $68.9 Million When He Left," Washington Post, March 25, 2003. 
26 CSX Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 31, 2004. 
27 “S&P 500 Performance Ranking”, Business Week, April 5, 2004.   
28 Glass, Lewis & Co. Proxy Paper, April 3, 2004 
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Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
 
Meeting Date: 4/23/04 
Item # 5:  Executive Pensions 
 
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
American Century 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
T. Rowe Price 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
American Funds 
 
Fidelity 
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Vanguard 
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Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
 
Leo F. Mullin 
Former Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation29 
 
Salary  $639,313
LTIP Payouts $353,200
Other30 $179,360
Option Grants31 $1,892,000
2003 Total $3,063,873
 
 
In 2002 while the airline industry was struggling with a sharp drop in business from the September 11 
terrorist attacks, Delta Air Lines paid $13.4 million (including tax payments) to set up a bankruptcy-
proof trust to fund the retirement benefits of then-CEO Leo Mullin, who retired May 1, 2004.  At the 
time, the company was hemorrhaging money, slashing jobs and seeking government assistance.32  All 
told, Delta paid $45 million into pension trusts for 35 Delta executives.33  Mr. Mullin's pension was 
based on 28.5 years of service even though his actual tenure was only 6.5 years.34  
 
These executive pension payments occurred at a time when Delta's pension plans for union employees -- 
which are only partially insured in the event of bankruptcy -- were underfunded, and after nonunion 
employees had been switched to less generous "cash balance" retirement plan.  The ensuing controversy 
caused the company to discontinue its executive retirement plan and to withhold a final payment to the 
executive trusts.35  
 
Business Week ranked the company near the bottom (#485) of the S&P 500, and last in its industry for 
its poor performance.  Business Week also gave Delta an "F" on eight performance measures (1-year 
total return, 3-year total return, 1-year sales growth, 3-year sales growth, 1-year profit growth, 3-year 
profit growth, net margin and return on equity).36  Likewise, independent proxy voting consultant Glass 
Lewis and Co. gave Delta an "F" in pay-for-performance, noting that Delta paid about the same as its 
peers, but performed significantly worse than its peers.37 
Inflated retirement benefits for executives undermines shareholders’ efforts to link pay to performance.  
For this reason, many favor requiring shareholder approval of these arrangements.  At Delta's April 23, 
2004 annual shareholder meeting, 53 percent of votes cast supported a proposal to seek shareholder 
approval for extraordinary retirement benefits for senior executives -- such as granting unearned years of 
service credit, accelerated vesting of rights under a benefit plan, or using bankruptcy-proof trusts to fund 
supplementary executive retirement plans.
                                                 
29 Delta Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 23, 2004. 
30 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation” and “All Other Compensation” including tax and financial planning services, use of a  company car, flight 
benefits, tax reimbursements, and a term life insurance savings plan. 
31 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
32 Russell Grantham, "Delta's bonuses fail to stop execs' flight," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 16, 2004. 
33 Evan Perez, "Pressured by Union, Delta Cancels Payment to Special Pension Plan," Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2003. 
34 Delta Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 23, 2004. 
35 Evan Perez, "Pressured by Union, Delta Cancels Payment to Special Pension Plan," Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2003. 
36 “S&P 500 Performance Ranking”, Business Week, April 5, 2004.   
37 Glass, Lewis & Co. Proxy Paper, March 30, 2004 
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Kohl’s Corp. 
 
 
Meeting Date:  4/28/04 
 
Item # 3:  Performance-based Pay  
 
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
American Century 
 
Janus 
 
T. Rowe Price 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
AIM 
 
American Funds 
 
Fidelity  
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Putnam 
 
Vanguard 
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Kohl’s Corp. 
 
R. Lawrence Montgomery 
Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation38 
 
Salary $1,014,583
Other39 $9,799
Option Grants40 $6,714,348
2003 Total $7,738,730
 
 
In 2003, Kohl’s Corp. paid CEO R. Lawrence Montgomery $7.7 million in total compensation including 
the potential realizable value of his stock option grants, more than six times his 2002 pay.41  In addition, 
the department store CEO cashed out $29.2 million by exercising stock options granted to him in 
previous years, catapulting him onto the Corporate Library’s top 10 list of S&P 500 CEO stock option 
profits in 2003 and Business Week’s list of the 20 highest paid CEO’s in the nation in 2003.42  Even after 
this enormous stock option cash-out, Mr. Montgomery still has a total of $53.4 million in unexercised, 
in-the-money options.43 
 
Kohl’s board of directors chose to reward Mr. Montgomery in 2003 with a large option grant despite the 
fact that the Kohl’s share price fell 15.4% for the year ending January 31, 2004, a period during which 
the S&P 500 Department Store Index jumped 36.4%.44  In fact, the company’s share price has lagged its 
peer group index for the one, two and three years ending January 31, 2004.  As a result, the department 
store chain fell to 203rd in Business Week’s 2003 S&P 500 Performance Ranking, from 34th the prior 
year, using eight criteria of financial success.  Business Week gave Kohl’s an “F” grade for both one- 
and three-year total return.45 
 
Because stock option grants have no downside risk below the strike price, they encourage executives to 
adopt “shoot for the moon” business strategies that are designed to promote short-term stock price rather 
than long-term corporate value.  Moreover, they can reward executives for temporary short-term results, 
even if this increase follows a long period of underperformance or is not sustainable.  At Kohl’s April 
28, 2004 annual meeting, shareholders voted 25 percent of the votes cast in favor of granting actual 
shares of stock for meeting performance benchmarks, and to require that executives hold those shares 
for as long as they remain company executives. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Kohl’s Corporation Proxy Statement filed March 30, 2004. 
39 “All Other Compensation,” including contributions to defined contribution plan and payments during fiscal 2002 under the Company’s life insurance plan. 
40 Potential realizable value at assumed 5 percent annual rate of stock price appreciation. 
41 Kohl’s Corporation Proxy Statement filed March 30, 2004.  
42 Hodgson, Paul, The Corporate Library’s CEO Pay Survey: CEO Pay 2003, The Corporate Library, July 2004.  Lavelle, Louis, “Executive Pay”, Business 
Week, April 19, 2004.  Business Week calculates executive pay based on options exercised, not granted, during the year. 
43 Kohl’s Corporation Proxy Statement filed March 30, 2004. 
44 Calculations based on data disclosed in Kohl’s Proxy Statement filed March 30, 2004. 
45 “S&P 500 Performance Ranking”, Business Week, April 5, 2004.   
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 Lucent Technologies Inc. 
 
Meeting Date:  2/18/04 
Item # 5:  Golden Parachutes 
 
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
American Century 
 
T. Rowe Price 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
AIM 
 
Fidelity 
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
  20
Lucent Technologies Inc. 
 
Patricia F. Russo 
Chair of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation46 
 
Salary  $1,200,000
Bonus $3,245,333
Other47 $41,209
Option Grants48 $2,140,000
2003 Total $6,626,542
 
 
If telecommunications manufacturer Lucent Technologies CEO Patricia Russo is terminated without 
cause, she is entitled to immediate vesting of 1,220,000 stock options and 550,000 restricted shares, as 
well as two years’ salary plus target bonus and continued benefit coverage and equity vesting for two 
years.  She is also entitled to a tax gross up on her golden parachute.  In total, Ms. Russo's severance 
benefits are worth an estimated $10 million or more, at a time when the company is slashing retiree 
benefits for ordinary workers.49   
 
In 2002, her first year on the job, Ms. Russo made $38 million while shareholders saw their investment 
plummet by 75 percent.  Ms. Russo was featured in Fortune magazine’s article entitled "Have They No 
Shame?" on CEOs whose performance "stank" while they "got paid more than ever."50  This year, 
Lucent topped the Wall Street Journal's list of the worst 5-year performers.51  Business Week ranked 
Lucent 473 in the S&P 500 and 30th of 35th in its industry for its poor performance.  Business Week 
also gave Lucent an "F" on seven performance measures (3-year total return, 1-year sales growth, 3-year 
sales growth, 1-year profit growth, 3-year profit growth, net margin and return on equity).52 
 
Requiring shareholder approval of executives’ employment agreements is one way that golden 
parachutes can be limited.  Moreover, excessive severance benefits can dramatically increase the cost of 
terminating an under-performing CEO, and reward the CEO for poor performance leading up to his or 
her termination.  For this reason, investors strongly favor limiting golden parachutes.  At Lucent's 
February 18, 2004 annual shareholder meeting, 67 percent of votes cast were in favor of a proposal to 
require shareholder approval of golden parachutes. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Lucent Corp. Proxy Statement filed December 23, 2003. 
47 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation” and “All Other Compensation” including above-market interest on deferred compensation, tax 
reimbursements, and company contributions to a savings plan. 
48 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
49 Employment Agreement between Lucent Technologies and Patricia F. Russo, dated February 14, 2002; Lucent Corp. Proxy Statement filed December 23, 
2003.  Jay Hancock, "Big payouts for bosses draw stockholder ire," The Baltimore Sun, February 25, 2004. 
50 Jerry Useem, "Have They No Shame?; Their performance stank last year, yet most CEOs got paid more than ever," Fortune, April 28, 2003. 
51 "Shareholder Scoreboard; The Best and Worst Performers of the WSJ 1000," Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2004. 
52 “S&P 500 Performance Ranking”, Business Week, April 5, 2004. 
  21
 Peoplesoft, Inc. 
 
 
 
Meeting Date: 3/25/04 
 
Item # 3:  Expense Stock Options  
 
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
American Century 
 
American Funds 
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Janus 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
AIM 
 
Fidelity 
 
Putnam 
 
T. Rowe Price 
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PeopleSoft, Inc. 
 
Craig A. Conway 
President and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation53 
 
Salary  $1,000,000
Bonus $2,325,000
Option Grants54 $16,940,064
2003 Total $20,265,064
 
 
A hostile takeover bid by the Oracle Corporation may have executives at the enterprise software 
company PeopleSoft, Inc. feeling nervous.  At least PeopleSoft CEO Craig Conway doesn’t have to 
worry about his severance.  In the event of a change in control, Conway’s employment contract 
promises a golden parachute equal to two years’ salary and bonus, plus immediate vesting of all stock 
options and restricted stock.  In 2003, Conway took home over 10 percent of all stock option grants to 
PeopleSoft employees, and by year-end he held over $29 million in-the-money stock options. 
 
Oracle’s buyout offer may have been triggered by PeopleSoft’s recent poor performance.  
Business Week ranked PeopleSoft 411 in the S&P 500, and 20 out of 28 in the software and services 
industry.  Business Week graded PeopleSoft an “F” for 3-year total return, 1-year profit growth, and 
return on equity.56  Independent proxy voting consultant Glass Lewis & Co. gave PeopleSoft an “F” for 
pay-for-performance, noting that “[t]he Company’s compensation to its CEO was significantly more 
than the median” for comparable companies.57 
 
In response to shareholder concern, PeopleSoft has recently taken steps to reduce its total potential 
dilution from stock options, which reached 35.5 percent compared to its peer group median of 25.1 
percent.58  PeopleSoft also promised to add performance-based requirements to its executives’ future 
equity compensation awards.59  Shareholders want PeopleSoft to go further: at the March 25, 2004 
annual meeting a majority of votes were cast in favor of stock option expensing.  Had PeopleSoft 
expensed stock options in 2003, its $85 million net profit would have turned into a $75 million net 
loss.60 
  
                                                 
53PeopleSoft, Inc. Proxy Statement filed February 23, 2004. 
54Potential realizable value at assumed 5 percent annual rate of stock price appreciation. 
55PeopleSoft, Inc. Proxy Statement filed February 23, 2004. 
56“S&P 500 Performance Ranking”, Business Week, April 5, 2004. 
57Glass, Lewis & Co. Proxy Paper, March 16, 2004 
58Investor Responsibility Research Center 
59PeopleSoft, Inc. Proxy Statement filed February 23, 2004 
60PeopleSoft, Inc. 10-K filed March 4, 2004 
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Raytheon Co. 
 
 
 
Meeting Date: 5/5/04 
 
Item # 7:  Expense Stock Options  
 
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
 Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
American Century 
 
American Funds 
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
AIM 
 
Fidelity 
 
Putnam 
 
T. Rowe Price  
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Raytheon Co. 
 
William H. Swanson 
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation61 
 
Salary  $858,090
Bonus $1,355,000
Restricted Stock $3,939,000
Other62 $317,814
Option Grants63 $2,941,516
2003 Total $9,411,420
 
 
Defense electronics company Raytheon paid its newly-promoted CEO, William H. Swanson, $9.4 
million in total compensation for 2003.  Mr. Swanson has another $2,440,155 in unexercised stock 
options from his previous years as a top Raytheon executive, as well as $1 million in interest-free 
loans.64 Compared to its competitors, Raytheon is a prolific grantor of stock options: Raytheon’s total 
potential dilution from stock options is 15.1 percent compared to its peer group median of 12.4 
percent.65 
 
Even though Raytheon argues that the compensation of its CEO and other senior executives is based on 
“performance and comparability,” the company’s performance has not been as stunning as its CEO’s 
compensation package.  Business Week ranked Raytheon 321 in the S&P 500, and 29 out of 37 in the 
capital goods industry.  Business Week graded Raytheon with an “F” for 1-year total return and profit 
growth.66 
 
Raytheon does not recognize the cost of its stock option grants as an expense.  This failure to expense 
can promote the excessive use of stock options in a company’s executive compensation.  Had Raytheon 
expensed in 2003, its net earnings would have been reduced by $68 million – representing a 19% 
decrease in net earnings.67  No wonder that at Raytheon’s May 5, 2004 annual meeting, 66.5 percent of 
voting shareholders approved a proposal to require stock option expensing.   
 
                                                 
61 Raytheon Co. Proxy Statement Filed May 5, 2004. 
62 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation” and “All Other Compensation” including reimbursements for tax payments, personal use of company aircraft, 
personal use of company automobiles, life insurance, excess executive liability insurance, ancillary expenses, and interest-free loans. 
63 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
64 Raytheon Co. Proxy Statement filed May 5, 2004. 
65 Investor Responsibility Research Center, April 22, 2004. 
66 “S&P 500 Performance Ranking,” Business Week, April 5, 2004.   
67 Raytheon Co. 10-K filed March 15, 2004. 
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Sprint Corp. 
 
 
 
Meeting Date: 4/20/04 
 
Item # 3:  Performance-based Pay  
 
Votes “FOR” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
AIM 
 
 American Century 
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Janus 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
T. Rowe Price 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
American Funds 
 
Fidelity 
 
Putnam 
 
Vanguard 
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Sprint Corp. 
 
Gary D. Forsee 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
Sprint Corp. FON 
 
2003 Compensation68 
 
Salary  $813,410
Bonus $2,532,206
Other69 $255,591
Restricted Stock $12,844,751
Option Grants70 $10,691,344
2003 Total $27,137,302
 
 
In 2003, Business Week lambasted the compensation committee of Sprint’s board of directors for 
granting excessive pay to executives and abusing stock options.  “The compensation panel didn't seem 
to know how to say no to management,” wrote Business Week.  “It repriced executive options and 
allowed execs to cash in options worth hundreds of millions of dollars when shareholders approved a 
WorldCom merger -- even though regulators rejected the deal.”71   
 
Unfortunately for shareholders, Sprint continues to award outrageous pay packages to executives even 
as the company’s financial performance and share price languish.  In 2003, the global 
telecommunications company paid its new CEO, Gary D. Forsee, a staggering $27.1 million in total 
compensation, including stock option grants worth $10.7 million.72  Mr. Forsee received this generous 
pay package despite the fact that Business Week ranked Sprint’s performance 418th out of the S&P 500 
using eight criteria of financial success.  Sprint received “F” grades from Business Week for return on 
equity, one- and three-year profit growth and one- and three-year sales growth.73   
 
At Sprint’s April 20, 2004 annual meeting, shareholders voted on a policy to require that all future stock 
options granted to senior executives be performance-based.  A stock option is performance-based if the 
option exercise price is indexed so that the options have value only to the extent that the company’s 
stock price performance exceeds its peer group performance level.  This performance-based pay 
proposal received the support of 32 percent of the votes cast. 
                                                 
68 Sprint Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 16, 2004. 
69 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation and “All Other Compensation,” including reimbursement of legal and professional fees paid by Mr. Forsee in 
connection with the negotiation of his employment contract. 
70 Potential realizable value at assumed 5 percent annual rate of stock price appreciation. 
71 Lavelle, Louis, “Sprint's Board Needs A Good Sweeping, Too,” Business Week, February 23, 2003. 
72 Sprint Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 16, 2004. 
73“S&P 500 Performance Ranking,” Business Week, April 5, 2004. 
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 Bear Stearns Co. 
 
 
 
Meeting Date:  3/31/04 
 
Item # 2:  Capital Accumulation Plan 
 
Votes “AGAINST” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
AIM 
 
American Century 
 
Janus 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
T. Rowe Price 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
Fidelity 
 
 Franklin-Templeton 
 
Putnam 
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Bear Stearns Co. 
 
James E. Cayne 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation74 
   
Salary  $200,000
Bonus $11,009,432
Restricted Stock $10,419,633
Option Grants75 $5,397,317
Other76 $12,296,347
2003 Total $39,322,729
 
 
A study of executive pay commissioned by the New York Times put Bear Stearns CEO James Cayne 
near the top of the list of career earners (Mr. Cayne collected $247 million over ten years).77  Mr. Cayne 
also served on the New York Stock Exchange compensation committee that approved Chairman Richard 
Grasso's lavish deferred compensation package.78  Like Mr. Grasso, Bear Stearns’ CEO has accumulated 
a sizable nest egg for retirement.  Mr. Cayne has amassed over $85 million in deferred stock in Bear 
Stearns’ Capital Accumulation Plan.  He also received over $12 million in preferential earnings in 
addition to cash dividends on these shares. 79 
 
At the March 31, 2004 annual shareholder meeting, Bear Stearns asked shareholders to approve its 
Capital Accumulation Plan.  Under the plan, each year Bear Stearns may award stock grants up to 15 
percent of the total outstanding shares to executives.  This means that during the life of the plan, stock 
exceeding 150 percent of today’s total outstanding shares may be transferred to executives.  Combined 
with Bear Stearns’ other equity compensation plans, total potential dilution is a massive 229.8 percent 
compared to a peer group median of 14.2 percent.80 
 
Past awards to executives under the Capital Accumulation Plan have not been modest.  As of November 
30, 2003, the top five executives held a combined $409 million in shares under the plan.  During 2003, 
Bear Stearns recognized from this plan an expense of $295 million in grants and $193 million in 
preferential earnings to executives, the equivalent of 42 percent of Bear Stearns 2003 net income.81  Not 
surprisingly, 41 percent of votes were cast against this plan, and independent proxy advisor Institutional 
Shareholder Services recommended a “no” vote. 
 
                                                 
74 Bear Stearns Corp. Proxy Statement filed February 27, 2004. 
75 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
76 “All Other Compensation” includes preferential earnings on the Capital Accumulation Plan. 
77 Patrick McGeehan, "What Pays a Legend Most? In Many Cases, It's the Options," The New York Times, April 4, 2004. 
78 Landon Thomas Jr., "A Pay Package That Fat Cats Call Excessive," The New York Times, August 29, 2003. 
79 Bear Stearns Corp. Proxy Statement filed February 27, 2004. 
80 Investor Responsibility Research Center, March 12, 2004. 
81 Bear Stearns 2003 Annual Report. 
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Broadcom Corp. 
 
 
Meeting Date:  04/29/04 
Item # 2:  Stock Incentive Plan  
Votes “AGAINST” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
AIM 
 
 American Century 
 
Fidelity 
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Janus 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
Putnam 
 
T. Rowe Price 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
None 
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Broadcom Corp. 
 
Alan E. Ross 
President and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation82 
 
Salary  $522,000
Bonus $250,000
Option Grants83 $3,256,102
Other84    $173,729
2003 Total $4,201,102
 
In describing the pay practices of this broadband communications and networking company, the New 
York Times observed that “just when you thought you had seen the most outrageous transfer of 
shareholder wealth to executives through stock options, along comes a company that tops them all.”85  
Last year Broadcom CEO Alan Ross exercised $2.1 million in stock options, and held $8 million in 
unexercised in-the-money stock options as of December 31, 2003.  In 2001 and again in 2003 the 
company had allowed employees to exchange their underwater stock options.86 
 
Mr. Ross chairs the Board’s Option Committee that is responsible for administering the company’s 
stock option plans.87  At the April 29, 2004 annual shareholder meeting, management asked 
shareholders to renew the company’s Stock Incentive Plan.  The plan explicitly permits stock option 
repricing, and adds 12 million shares, increasing Broadcom’s total potential dilution to 92.4 percent 
compared to a peer group median of 25.1 percent.88  Had Broadcom expensed stock options in 2003, its 
net losses would have increased by $448 million, or 47 percent.89 
 
Independent proxy voting consultants Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis & Co. 
opposed the plan, with Glass Lewis noting that it had “failed miserably and is among the most expensive 
and liberal plans we have reviewed.”90  While an overwhelming majority (89 percent) of Class A shares 
voted against the plan, it passed over the objection of outside shareholders because the company's dual 
class stock structure gives insiders disproportionate voting power.91 
                                                 
82 Broadcom Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 29, 2004. 
83 Potential realizable value at assumed 5 percent annual rate of stock price appreciation. 
84 “Other Annual Compensation,” including reimbursement for Ross's use of his private airplane, housing and travel expenses, tax reimbursements, and 
income realized for life insurance premiums. 
85 Gretchen Morgenson, “Bubble Lives on at Broadcom, Where Options Still Rain Down,” The New York Times, April 18, 2004. 
86 Broadcom Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 29, 2004. 
87 Broadcom Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 29, 2004. 
88 Investor Responsibility Research Center, April 15, 2004. 
89 Broadcom Corp. 10-K filed March 15, 2004. 
90 Glass Lewis & Co. Proxy Paper, April 8, 2004. 
91 Broadcom Corp. 10-Q filed August 9, 2004. 
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Delphi Corp. 
 
 
 
Meeting Date:  5/6/04 
Item # 4:  Long-Term Incentive Plan 
Votes “AGAINST” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
American Century 
 
American Funds 
 
Fidelity 
 
Putnam 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
AIM 
 
Franklin-Templeton  
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
T. Rowe Price 
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Delphi Corp. 
 
J.T. Battenberg III 
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation92 
 
Salary  $1,675,000
Other93 $159,690
Restricted Stock $1,213,920
LTIP $732,000
Option Grants94 $2,178,528
2003 Total $5,959,138
 
 
At auto parts manufacturer Delphi, executives disproportionately benefit from equity compensation.  In 
2003, the top five most highly paid Delphi executives received 17.5 percent of all stock options granted 
to employees.  Stock options are the single biggest component of Delphi CEO J.T. Battenberg's total 
compensation, and Mr. Battenberg alone received 7.8 percent of all grants to employees in 2003.  At the 
end of the year, Mr. Battenberg held $1.7 million in unexercised in-the-money stock options.95 
 
Business Week ranked the company near the bottom (#435) of the S&P 500 and seventh out of nine in its 
industry for poor performance.  Business Week also gave the Delphi an "F" on five performance 
measures (3-year total return, 1-year profit growth, 3-year profit growth, net margin, and return on 
equity).96  Likewise, independent proxy voting consultant Glass Lewis and Co. gave Delphi an "F" in 
pay-for-performance, noting that Delphi paid more than its peers, but performed worse than its peers.97 
 
At Delphi's May 6, 2004 annual shareholder meeting, 34.6 percent of votes cast opposed management's 
proposal to increase the number of shares available under the company's Employee Long-Term 
Incentive and Share Award Plan.  The proposal authorized the issuance of 36.5 million shares for equity 
compensation, increasing Delphi’s total potential dilution to 22.7 percent compared to its peer group 
median of 14.5 percent.98  Had Delphi expensed stock options, its 2003 net losses would have increased   
by $17 million, or 30 percent.99 
                                                 
92 Delphi Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 26, 2004. 
93 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation” and “All Other Compensation” including use of company transportation, matching contributions under the 
stock purchase plan, and life insurance premiums. 
94 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
95 Delphi Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 26, 2004. 
96 “S&P 500 Performance Ranking”, Business Week, April 5, 2004.   
97 Glass Lewis & Co. Proxy Paper, April 9, 2004. 
98 Investor Responsibility Research Center, April 26, 2004. 
99 Delphi 10-K filed April 1, 2004. 
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Union Pacific Corp. 
 
 
 
Meeting Date:  4/16/04 
 
Item # 2:  Stock Incentive Plan 
 
Votes “AGAINST” This Proposal Support Limiting Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting AGAINST 
 
American Century 
 
Fidelity 
 
Oppenheimer Funds 
 
Vanguard 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Families Voting FOR 
 
AIM 
 
 American Funds 
 
Franklin-Templeton 
 
Janus 
 
Putnam 
 
T. Rowe Price 
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Union Pacific Corp. 
 
Richard K. Davidson 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
 
2003 Compensation100 
 
Salary  $1,258,333
Other101 $301,115
Restricted Stock $4,500,000
LTIP $7,999,113
Option Grants102   $4,646,395
2003 Total $18,704,956
 
 
In 2001, the Union Pacific Board approved a long-term incentive pay plan whereby executives would 
receive stock units and cash if the company's stock traded above $70 a share for 20 days or the 
company's three-year earnings totaled at least $13.50 a share.  To help meet the second of these goals, 
the compensation committee included in "earnings" the proceeds from the company's initial public 
offering of its Overnite unit.  As a result of this creative accounting, Union Pacific CEO Richard 
Davidson was able to collect 20,000 shares and $1.4 million in cash.103 
 
The lion’s share of Union Pacific’s stock options is awarded to top executives.  Mr. Davidson alone 
received 13.6 percent of all grants to employees in 2003.  He also exercised $1 million in stock options 
from previous years’ grants, and as of December 31, 2003 held over $34 million in unexercised in-the-
money stock options.104  Proxy voting consultant Glass Lewis & Co. gave Union Pacific an "D" in pay-
for-performance, noting that Union Pacific paid significantly more than its peers, but performed about 
the same as its peers.105 
 
At Union Pacific's April 16, 2004 annual shareholder meeting, 32.5 percent of votes cast opposed 
management's proposed Stock Incentive Plan.  The proposal authorized the issuance of 21 million shares 
for equity compensation, increasing Union Pacific’s total potential dilution to 18.7 percent compared to 
a peer group median of 12.4 percent.  The company does not disclose its performance goals or holding 
period guidelines, and the plan includes a provision for immediate vesting in the event of a change of 
control.106 
 
 
                                                 
100 Union Pacific Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 10, 2004. 
101 Sum total of “Other Annual Compensation” and “All Other Compensation” including reimbursements for tax on supplemental pension and thrift plans, 
above-market interest paid on deferred compensation, use of company transportation, tax and financial counseling, matching contributions under the stock 
purchase plan, and life insurance premiums. 
102 Grant date present value based on the Black-Scholes model of option valuation. 
103 Gretchen Morgenson, "Pay Package at Risk? Quick, Get Creative," The New York Times, November 23, 2003. 
104 Union Pacific Corp. Proxy Statement filed March 10, 2004. 
105 Glass Lewis & Co. Proxy Paper, April 5, 2004. 
106 Investor Responsibility Research Center, April 15, 2004 
